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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Recently, it has become very clear that the \trinity" of liberalization, sta-
bilization and privatization are not sucient conditions for a successful
economic transition. While some economies (e.g. Poland and the Czech
Republic) have seemingly turned to sustainable development, the Russian
economy continues to stagnate. Among various explanations of the contin-
ued failure of the economy to grow, the inability of the state to promote the
development of \good" economic institutions, and the unexpected stability
of \bad" ones, appear to be of particular interest.
The process of the public enforcement and regulation of property rights
by the state is inuenced by social demands: agents reveal their prefer-
ences for government policy through the usual political mechanisms. It is
commonly expected that it is the rich agents who favor the full protection
of property rights by the state. However, there is substantial evidence
that in Russia, as well as in some other transition economies, rich agents
are the main beneciaries of poor protection of property rights. When
property rights are poorly dened and protected, wealthier agents can
gain from non-productive activities, such as rent-seeking or other costly
redistributive activity, via the maintenance of expensive capacities for ap-
propriation. In the absence of an adequate protection of property rights
by the state, rent-oriented structures possessed by relatively rich agents |
Russia's so-called \oligarchs" | have taken control of a substantial share
of the national economy. Indeed, these structures combine productive ac-
tivity with an extensive struggle for the rent-seeking pie. Their success at
rent-seeking makes it unsurprising that the \oligarchs" prefer a relatively
poor protection of property rights. This, in turn, forces other economic
agents to invest privately in protection from appropriation. This may be
the main reason why the Russian state has, as yet, failed to establish and
enforce a clearly-dened system of property rights.
The results of the theoretical part of the paper cast light on some of
the mechanisms underlying the negative impact on economic performance
of poor protection of property rights. Agents with no political power
to appropriate privately the fruits of their eorts must devote substan-
tial resources to the private protection of their productive capital, and
this reduces the attractiveness of production. Typically, mechanisms of
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redistribution (direct, or indirect, through taxation, pension systems, etc.)
are designed in favor of the poor. For many transition and developing
economies, however, it seems plausible that rich agents are the main ben-
eciaries of redistribution.
The paper develops a model with heterogeneous agents which may invest
their resources either in production or in the private protection of property
rights. Private protection of property rights is dened to be the protection
provided against other would-be protectors, usually criminals, as well as
contracting partners who fail to fulll the terms of the contract (e.g. repay
the debt) or who avoid doing so, etc. It is by no means assumed that
an agent investing in private protection invests in military capacities, or
such like. Rather, this may be investment in relational capital, e.g. in
establishing corrupt relations with state authorities or simply in hiring a
lawyer. In economic terms, private protection is a strategy adopted by
an economic agent to increase eciency and predictability in its business
relations. In equilibrium, all agents spend some resources on protection,
but only rich agents gain from rent-seeking redistributive activities.
Thus, poor public protection of property rights aects growth as follows.
First, the resources devoted to private protection are totally wasted, that
is they are neither consumed nor used for production. Second, the agents
that lose out in redistribution over-consume before redistribution takes
place and thus the equilibrium resource allocation is sub-optimal. In the
absence of ecient capital markets the direct eect of inequality on growth
is negative: increased inequality causes agents to consume resources they
could have otherwise invested in production. The indirect eect is vice
versa: the larger the inequity, i.e. the poorer the pivotal voter, the greater
the demand for the public protection of property rights. Also, the poorer
the losers from redistribution, the less attractive is redistribution for the
winners.
The theoretical ndings of the paper are supported by empirical evidence.
During the transition (since 1992), Russian regions have demonstrated
enormous dierences in growth rates. In the empirical part of the paper,
it is found that these dierences may be explained by the initial conditions
(measured by the pre-reform value | added in the tradable-goods sector
and by employment in military industry) and the eectiveness of the in-
stitutions (proxied both by the number of small newly-registered private
businesses and by various risk ratings). Also, the paper nds a positive
impact of income inequality on the level of public protection of property
rights. The model provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon,
6 INEQUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
as previously described. At the same time, this suggests that the level of
the protection of property rights is determined (in the framework of the
analysis) by a narrow group of agents.
It can be easily seen that improvements in the eld of the protection of
property rights (both in the level and in their eectiveness), and a re-
duction in the level of rent-seeking activity, which in turn should reduce
inequality, are unavoidable preconditions for economic growth. Such im-
provements may occur only if they are in the self-interest of the majority of
the population, or at least of the majority of those agents that eectively
determine policy. In this respect, an increasing involvement of economic
agents in policy-making should lead to greater public protection of prop-
erty rights and thus to increased growth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, it has become very clear that liberalization, stabilization, and
privatization in an economy in transition are not sucient conditions for an
upturn in economic activity. The Russian economy continues to stagnate.
Among various explanations of the continued failure of the economy to
grow, the inability of the state to promote development of \good" economic
institutions and the unexpected stability of \bad" ones appears to be of
particular interest.
Generally, the process of public enforcement and regulation of property
rights by the state are inuenced by social demands. Agents reveal their
preferences over government policy through usual political mechanisms.
It is quite natural to expect that it is the rich agents who favor the full
protection of property rights. However, there is substantial evidence that
in Russia, as well as in some other transition economies, the rich agents are
the main beneciaries of poor protection of property rights, which allows
them to gain from non-productive activities such as rent-seeking
1
through
maintenance of appropriation capacities. In the absence of adequate public
protection of property rights by the state, these rent-oriented structures
took control of a substantial share of the national economy. More precisely,
these structures (the largest of them are so called oligarchies) combine
productive activity with an extensive struggle for the rent-seeking pie.
Their success at rent-seeking makes it non-surprising that the oligarchs
prefer relatively poor protection of property rights. This in turn forces the
other economic agents to invest in protection from appropriation. This
may be the main reason why the Russian state has failed to establish and
enforce a clearly dened system of property rights as yet (see Leitzel, 1997).
Recently, Frye and Shleifer (1997) conducted a survey of shopkeepers in
Moscow and Warsaw and compared the eectiveness of the Russian and
Polish legal systems in dispute resolution and the role of protection rackets.
Their study showed that in Russia, the demand for private protection of
property rights is extremely high, and also that enterprises have to operate
in much more corrupt environment.
Private protection of property rights is dened to be the protection
provided against other would be protectors, usual criminals, contracting
1
In this paper, rent-seeking is dened to be any costly redistributive activity.
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partners who fail or avoid to fulll terms of the contract (e.g., repay the
debt), etc. It is by no means assumed that an agent investing in pri-
vate protection invests in military capacities or such like. Rather, it may
be investment in relational capital, e.g. in establishing corrupt relations
with state authorities, and even hiring a lawyer. In economic terms, it is
a strategy of an economic agent to increase eciency and predictability
in its business relations. Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (1998) distin-
guish seven types of such strategies. However, their denition of private
protection is too narrow for the approach employed in this paper. Pri-
vate enforcement of property rights should also include such strategies as
relational contracting (assumed to be costly) and corruption of state ad-
ministration. Of course, the agent may simply pay for the third-party
enforcement (maa, say).
2
Frye and Zhuravskaya (1998) provide the re-
sults of survey of shopkeepers in three Russian cities. Percent of respon-
dents who answered \yes" to the question \If the following is a function
of racket":
Protection 82 %
Enforce agreements 33 %
Deal with authorities 13 %
Investment source 12 %
Attract customers 1 %
In the initial Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking and in a great ma-
jority of other papers devoted to directly unproductive activities, agents
compare their costs with their benets of participating in rent-seeking.
In these models, agents usually have a clear choice of whether or not to
participate in appropriation (or perhaps mix productive and appropriative
activities). For Russia, it seems reasonable to assume that there can be no
business without investment in private protection of property rights (Alex-
eev, Gaddy, and Leitzel, 1997; Leitzel, 1997; Frye and Zhuravskaya, 1998).
Then, as stressed in Shleifer (1995), the agents having private protection
have incentives to appropriate resources from others. Thus, wide-spread
private enforcement of property rights in transition economies is inherently
stable.
There is substantial empirical and theoretical evidence that rent-seeking
is harmful for growth. It is worth to emphasize three essential types of
2
Leitzel (1997) stresses that the main dierence between \maa" private protec-
tion and protection provided by a Western-style security rm is the diculty of
exit.
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negative consequences of poor protection of property rights. First, the
necessity to protect wastes resources as protection/appropriation is an un-
productive activity. Second, the threat of appropriation distorts the eco-
nomic environment and leads to suboptimal paths of capital accumulation
and production. Third, extensive rent-seeking and improper public protec-
tion of property rights are usually associated with substantial income and
wealth inequality. The impacts of inequality and redistribution policies on
economic growth are studied in various growth theory papers. In Alesina
and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) it is shown, both the-
oretically and empirically, that inequality is harmful for growth. However,
in these papers, and also in Perotti (1993), mechanisms of redistribution
are designed in favor of the poor, while for Russia it seems more plausible
to model redistribution of wealth in favor of the rich. Benabou (1996)
extends these models (particularly, the model of Persson and Tabellini,
1994) to explore the impact of inequality on economic growth in detail.
Dynamics of wealth distribution and its impact on economic performance
in transition economies are studied in Ferreira (1996). In particular, con-
sequences of privatization are considered. The model is a reincarnation
of the one presented in a seminal paper of Banerjee and Newman (1993).
The economic mechanism of the latter, and of Aghion and Bolton (1997),
which also generates the Kuznets inverted-U relation between income in-
equality and per capita output, is based on imperfections in the capital
market. The theoretical model of the present paper lays in the general
framework of Verdier (1994) and follows the pattern of Benabou (1996).
Negative impact of poor protection of property rights on economic growth
is stressed in classical works such as Nort (1981). Classical sources on rent-
seeking are Krueger (1974) and Tullock (1980). For economies in transi-
tion, Polishchuk (1996) studies the impact of capital market imperfections
on protection of property rights. (Also, see a review in Gelb, Hilmann, and
Ursprung, 1996.) Using axiomatic approach, income distribution in a rent-
seeking environment is studied in Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992), and
Skaperdas and Syropuolos (1997). In Grossman and Kim (1995) agents
allocate real resources between appropriative and productive activities in
a general equilibriummodel. Although the game described in this paper is
one-shot, in the concluding section authors state that it would be interest-
ing to extend the model to a dynamic framework. In Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1993) rent-seeking activity exhibit increasing returns and thus is
more attractive relative to production. This leads to multiple equilibria,
with \bad" equilibrium being stable and exhibiting a low level of out-
put. It should be noted that for suciently high levels of rent-seeking,
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an increase in a number of rent-seekers reduces their income as the \pie"
of the same size is divided by an increased number of participants. Also,
there is a vast literature on interrelationship of law and nance (various
papers of La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny) which stresses
the necessity of adequate investor and minority shareholder protection,
etc.
Spontaneous emergence of property rights and appropriation activity in
economies in transition were considered in Shleifer (1995), Polishchuk and
Savvateev (1997). A model of an economy in transition with poor pro-
tection of property rights is presented and compared with evidence from
China in Li (1996). An empirical evidence on unocial economy in transi-
tion (note that an unocial economy relies exclusively on private contract
enforcement) is presented and extensively discusses in Johnson, Kaufman,
and Shleifer (1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a theoretical
model is presented and its implications are briey discussed. Section 3
presents results of an empirical investigation testing the theory implica-
tions, and discusses evidence obtained from other sources. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2. THE THEORY
2.1. Agents
There is a continuum

0; 1

of heterogeneous overlapping-generations fam-
ilies. Each member i born at the period t has the utility function
u
it
= ln c
it
+  ln d
it
;
where c
it
is consumption when young, d
it
is consumption when old, and  is
the common discount factor. This agent i is born endowed with individual-
specic basic level of skills w
it
: To simplify the subsequent analysis, I will
assume that the skills are distributed across agents log-normally:
lnw
it
 N (m;
2
);
and let w
t
denote the mean (and the aggregate) level of basic skills, w
t
=
= Ew
it
= e
(m+
2
=2)
.
3
Intergenerational linkages are as follows:
w
it+1
= "
it+1
y
it
; (2.1)
3
I will also assume that 
2
> =(1 + ):
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where "
it+1
is an i.i.d. shock with mean 1 and Var (ln "
it+1
) = 
2
, y
it
is
the second-period income of the member of family i (to be dened later).
Similar assumptions are maintained in Persson and Tabellini (1994), Ben-
abou (1996). Herein time indices are skipped as the analysis is focused on
members of one generation.
2.2. Production Technology
Each agent i has an access to a Cobbs{Douglas technology, so that the
second-period income is y
i
= A
e
k

i
w
1 
; where
e
k
i
is productive capital
after redistribution, A is an exogenously given technological parameter,
and w is the economy-wide endowment of basic skills. The
e
k
i
depends not
only on the capital investment k
i
of the agent i, but also on investment
of the agent i into private protection of property rights and both types of
investment of the other agents (see below). There are no credit markets,
so agents have no possibility to borrow or lend to optimize consumption
intertemporarily. This idealistic assumption seems relevant in a study of
economies in transition (see Polishchuk, 1995). Below, I will briey discuss
the case when capital markets exist.
2.3. Private Enforcement of Property Rights
In addition to investment in production (see below), each agent may invest
in protection of her property rights. If k
i
is the capital expenditures of the
agent i, and h
i
is the amount invested in protection, then after redistribu-
tion the agent's i productive capital is
e
k
i
= k
i
h

i
g. The factor g is dened
by the balance condition
Z
1
0
e
k
i
di =
Z
1
0
k
i
h

i
g di =
Z
1
0
k
i
di:
The parameter   0 measures the eectiveness of appropriative tech-
nology. (This technology is both oensive and defensive in the sense of
Grossman and Kim, 1995.) The case  = 0 then corresponds to full public
protection of property rights. In this case, h
i
= 0; g = 1; and no redistri-
bution actually take place. If  > 0; then each agent invests some positive
amount of capital in appropriation/protection activity. Note that the bal-
ance condition above shows that the appropriative investment is totally
wasted. In Tullock (1980) words, there is a negative sum game.
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The after-redistribution capital of the agent i is
e
k
i
=
k
i
h

i
R
1
0
k
i
h

i
di
Z
1
0
k
i
di:
This might be interpreted as a special form of Tullock rent-seeking compe-
tition (Tullock, 1980). Here contest inputs h
i
are weighted by the amount
of capital invested, and the whole capital invested in production forms the
rent-seeking pie. This type of redistribution possesses the basic features of
Tullock competition: the relative success is a function of the parties" re-
spective resource commitments. Precisely, the agent's proportionate share
of the pie depends positively on her contest input and negatively on contest
inputs of the others. It should be noted that here the value of the prize,
R
1
0
k
i
di; is endogenous variable as productive and appropriative capital are
rival uses of resources (see Hirshleifer, 1988 and Skaperdas, 1995). Also, it
is assumed, departing from the initial Tullock framework, that each agent
takes
R
1
0
k
i
h

i
di as given.
2.4. Inequality and Growth
Agent i has the following maximization problem:
max
k
i
;h
i

ln(w
i
  k
i
  h
i
) +  ln
 
A(k
i
h

i
g)

w
1 
	
:
This maximization problem presumes that there are no capital markets.
Although such an extreme assumption is not unusual in transition liter-
ature, the case of perfect capital markets will be briey discussed below.
A standard procedure gives the solution:
k
i
=

1 + (1 + )
w
i
= s()w
i
;
h
i
=

1 + (1 + )
w
i
= s()w
i
:
The intuition is straightforward: investment in productive capital rises
with improvement of property rights protection ( decreases) and produc-
tivity, ; that is s
0
() < 0 and s
0
() > 0; while investment in appropriation
and thus welfare losses rise with : Note that those agents that loose in
redistribution overconsume in the rst period, while those who gain un-
derconsume. That is, beside the dead-weight losses, rent-seeking distorts
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economic environment. The second-period income of the agent i is
y
i
= As

w
(1+)
i
w
 
Ew
1+
i


: (2.2)
Summing over all agents, one can get an expression for the growth rate of
the aggregate income:
() = ln(y=w) = lnA+  ln s   (1   )(1 + )
2

2
2
: (2.3)
The intuition is again straightforward. With low level of property rights
protection (high ) agents divert more resources from production to private
protection of property rights (appropriation). This is in line with results of
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993). Since the rich are the main benecia-
ries of redistributive activity in the model, inequality hampers productive
investment and thus growth.
Proposition 1.
4
(i) Growth rate increases with the level of property rights
protection; and is maximized when property rights are fully secured ,  = 0.
(ii) Given any level of property rights protection ; inequality (as repre-
sented by ) reduces growth.
The negative eect of poor protection of property rights comes from two
Sources. First, the higher is , i.e. the lower is the level of property
rights protection by the state, the more resources, =[1 + (1 + )],
is devoted to private protection, a directly unproductive activity. Sec-
ond, an increase in  makes budget constraints more binding; this eect
is reected in the second term of equation (2.3): in the absence of asset
markets poor underinvest compared to the socially ecient level. If the
capital market is perfect with the interest rate equal to the marginal prod-
uct of productive capital, then the growth rate is () = lnA +  ln s(),
and there is no second eect of incomplete protection of property rights as
all the agents will invest the same amount of capital in production. Also,
in this case inequality does not aect the growth rate. In the current set-
ting, the result (ii) is similar to those of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and
Benabou (1996), and diers from those of Galor and Zeira (1993), Per-
otti (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Tsiddon (1996), or
Aghion and Bolton (1997), where eects of inequality and redistribution
on growth depend on the initial wealth or income distribution. In Persson
and Tabellini (1994), the basic model yields results similar to (ii), but it is
4
Proofs of this and subsequent propositions are straightforward calculations and
available from the author upon request.
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shown that the model may be easily modied to incorporate inuence of
initial wealth distribution on inequality eects. It should be noted that in
these models the poor are the beneciaries of redistribution. Redistribu-
tion toward relatively poor agents may occur through progressive taxation
of capital income, direct social transfers, extensive regulation, trade and
capital restrictions, etc. (See Benabou, 1996 and Alesina and Rodrik,
1994.) Persson and Tabellini (1994) simply assume that incomplete pro-
tection of property rights (through proportional tax on income) leads to
redistribution of wealth from rich agents to poor.
2.5. Individual Preferences over the Level
of Property Rights Protection
The next goal is to determine the level of property rights protection pre-
ferred by an agent i: Given some level , agent's i utility is:
u
i
() = ln(1  (1 + )s)w
i
+  lnAs

w
(1+)
i
w
 
Ew
1+
i


:
Each agent faces the following maximization problem:
max
0
u
i
()
It is an easy exercise to prove the following lemma, which provides the
basis for political economy analysis below. (Recall that 
2
> 1:)
Lemma 1. Every agent i has single-peaked preferences over   0.
Lemma 1 implies that agent's i problem has a unique solution, 

i
.
Proposition 2. Let w be such that lnw = 1+m+
2
= lnw+1+
2
=2.
(i) Any agent i with w
i
 w prefers full protection of property rights,


i
= 0.
(ii) Any agent i with w
i
> w prefers incomplete protection of property
rights, 

i
> 0.
(iii) If w
i
 w
j
; then 

i
 

j
; that is, the richer the agent; the less secured
property rights she prefers.
2.6. Political Economy
In recent rent-seeking literature, the level of property rights protection
is often endogenous (see, e.g., Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, the
nature of rent-seeking models left little chances that these models may
be modied for the study of growth issues. Perotti (1993), Alesina and
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Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) have
endogenized tax policy in the political equilibrium of endogenous-growth
models. In this subsection, my main goal is to endogenize the level of
property rights protection, as parametrized by ; in an analogous way. I
will assume that the old generation does not participate in the process.
The most straightforward approach is the use of the median-voter theorem
of Grandmont (1978). However, it is doubtful that transition economies
satisfy this \one person, one vote" ideal. Rather, anecdotal evidence
suggests that in Russia and other FSU countries the level of property
rights protection is determined by a relatively narrow group of powerful
agents. Following Benabou (1996), let it be the pivotal voter located at the
p-th percentile of the wealth (instead of usual 50 th percentile). Then her
wealth w
p
is dened by F
 
(lnw
p
  m)=)

= p; where F is the c.d.f. of
a standard normal. One can reformulate this as follows: lnw
p
= m + ;
where  = F
 1
(p): If  > 0; that is p > 1=2; the political system is biased
toward rich. Historically, this case corresponds to wealths-restricted fran-
chise, and today the bias toward rich might be due to their high lobbying
power, imperfect political information, dependence on transfers from the
central government in a transition economy, etc. For a deeper discussion
of a wealth bias of political system (see Benabou, 1996).
To investigate the eects of the wealth bias in the political system, sub-
stitute lnw
p
= m +  into u
0
i
() = 0 for w
p
 w (   + 1=) and note
that 

= 0 if    + 1=:
Proposition 3. (i) The more democratic is the society (the lower is the
degree of wealth bias of the pivotal voter; ; the more secure are property
rights in the political equilibrium (lower 

). If   +1=; then 

strictly
increases with .
(ii) The political equilibrium leads to full public protection of property
rights;  = 0; if and only if    + 1=.
(iii) An increase in inequality leads to a higher level of public property
rights protection.
The last statement follows from the fact that increased inequality reduces
the appropriation gains of the rich, and thus makes incomplete protec-
tion less attractive. This eect complicates investigation of the impact of
inequality on growth. While the direct eect of inequality on growth is
negative, an increase in inequality forces the pivotal voter (who, all other
things being equal, becomes poorer than before) to call for more secure
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property rights and favor more growth. Mathematically, one can write
down
d
d
=
@
@
+
@
@




=


@

@
;
where the rst term on the right-hand side represents the direct eect of
inequality on growth (holding policy, ; xed), and the second represents
the indirect one. If property rights are fully protected, then inequality
aects growth exclusively through binding wealth constraints.
2.7. Dynamics of Inequality and Multiple Equilibria
The formula 2.1 gives the intragenerational dynamics of income within a
family. Combining with 2.2, this gives the law of motion for the family's
income:
lnw
it+1
= ln "
it+1
+ lnA +  ln s + (1 + 
t
) lnw
i
+
+ lnw   

m(1 + 
t
) + (1 + 
t
)
2

2
t
2

;
where 
t
is the level of property rights protection chosen in period t. (Recall
that 
t
is chosen by agents born at the period t). Assuming Var(ln "
it+1
) =
= 
2
, one can get the autoregressive process for inequality:

2
t+1
= 
2
+ 
2
(1 + 
t
)
2

2
t
:
Now a marginal worsening of property rights protection increase not only
the current inequality, but also inequality in all future periods.
Proposition 4. If there is a strong wealth bias in the political system;
   + 1=; then there are multiple steady-states.
The presence of multiple steady states may provide an explanation of con-
siderably dierent transition paths of Poland and Russia (Frye and Shleifer,
1997). When a political system has a signicant wealth bias, it may be
locked in a bad long-run equilibrium, i.e. in an equilibrium with low level
protection of public protection of property rights and low growth rate.
Mathematically, a negative general equilibrium feedback of inequality on
the level of property rights protection worsens budget constraints, and this
eect allows to get multiple long-run steady states. The assumption of im-
perfect capital markets are crucial for this result: if agents are free to lend
to and borrow from each other, their investment will always be socially
optimal (given a level of property rights protection).
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2.8. Extensions
This subsection briey (and informally) discusses some straightforward
extensions of the model described above.
Redistribution Toward Poor. Many growth-theoretic models gener-
ate an inverted-U relationship between inequality and growth (see, e.g.,
Perotti, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1994; Benabou, 1996). To allow for this
eect in the model, it is necessary to introduce the \inverse" redistribution
from the rich to the poor (e.g., through progressive taxation and social se-
curity programs). Eects of such redistribution on growth in the case of
full protection of property rights is studied in detail in Benabou (1996).
In an economy with incomplete protection of property rights the redistri-
bution toward poor will reduce direct eects of rent-seeking redistribution,
but the qualitative results remain the same. Moreover, the situation will
worsen as the rent-seeking pie will increase and the rich agents will have
more incentives to invest in appropriation. This will also make existence
of multiple bad equilibria more probable.
Perfect Capital Markets. It is of course hard to imagine perfect cap-
ital markets in the absence of full protection of property rights. If we
instead assume that loans and debts are subject for appropriation in the
way described above, the results will be essentially the same.
Implications for FDI. Brock (1997) found foreign direct investment in
Russia (and other FSU countries) to be much lower than in East Euro-
pean transition economies (not to say about developed countries). Sim-
ilarly, FDI vary signicantly across Russian regions. Our analysis sheds
some light on this phenomenon: rst, investment in private protection is
waste of resources for a foreign investor; second, in terms of the model
above, the overall investment should be very large to allow for redistribu-
tion gains. The situation is even worse for a foreign investor as agencies
providing protection in the host can discriminate. Last but not least, such
an investment may be considered illegal in the domestic country of the
investor.
Why Is Manna so Harmful to Growth? Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1993) and Shleifer (1995) emphasize that rent-seeking may be self-
generating. The situation is worse, the bigger is the rent-seeking pie. For
example, when a foreign (e.g., IMF or the World Bank) loan is obtained,
large rent-seekers may maintain their appropriative capacities to struggle
for the pie, and then use the oensive weapons to appropriate resources
from others. Oense creates the demand for defense, and so on. Also,
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the argument applies to many privatization cases. Further, rent-seeking
is allowed (public protection of property rights is poor), the natural rents
(recall that the Gazprom pays 25 percent of taxes collected by Russian
government) constitute an attractive pie.
3. EVIDENCE
3.1. Taking the Model to the Data
The following messages of the theoretical model should be veried:
 Improper public protection of property rights and wide-spread rent-
seeking has a signicant negative impact on the economic growth of a
region. The hypothesis is that the larger the number of agents with rela-
tively small endowments (such as small newly registered enterprises) and
thus relatively small appropriation power, the higher the growth rate.
 Income inequality have positive impact on growth. Theoretically, it
should be assumed that the political system is wealth-biased ( is positive
and relatively large).
 A priori, regional government's eorts to establish duly protected prop-
erty rights and, more generally, to create a competitive environment should
have positive impact on growth. Since increased control of regional admin-
istration over capital assets reduces the level of \federal-level rent-seeking"
in the region, it should lead to higher level of public protection.
 Large rent-seeking pie (as proxied by, e.g., the share of expenditures
on governance in a region's budget) leads to a low level of property rights
protection by the state.
3.2. Growth in Cross-Section of Russian Regions
In this subsection, the analysis is focused on Russian regional data. Since
there are no reliable time-series data on many of our variables before 1994,
the analysis is restricted to cross-section. I look at data from a cross section
of Russian regions, each of which treated as a whole economy.
It is usually a challenging task to nd a good proxy for the level of rent-
seeking (or the level of property rights protection). I suggest several mea-
sures and will try to nd the one that is the best. There are various
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indirect measures of rent-seeking based on government budgetary alloca-
tions. (Such a measure may take into account pensions, social expendi-
tures, tax privileges, etc.) For Russia, the \degree of expenditure central-
ization" and the level of region-specic taxation may serve as measures of
rent-seeking activity. Capture of rents may be also reected in data on
regional-government control of its capital (buildings, equipment, machin-
ery, etc.), including ownership claims to enterprise assets that are dispersed
over several regions. For theft and racketeering (small-scale rent-seeking),
the number of newly registered privately owned small enterprises might
be used as a proxy of the level of public protection of property rights
in a region. Laband and Sophocleus (1988), while measuring the social
cost of rent-seeking using cross-sectional data on US states, employed the
number of legal and business services establishments per capita in each
state in a base year as proxies for the level of rent-seeking. Berkowitz and
DeJong (1999) found that the formation of new enterprises has a signicant
positive impact on growth of Russian regions (see below). The model ul-
timately predicts the positive impact such enterprises have on the region's
growth rate. It is likely that these new, small enterprises correspond to
the agents in our model that have   0 and so demand the optimal level
of property rights protection.
In the empirical study, I also used the risk ranking given to all Russian
regions by the Bank of Austria using 1995 and earlier data as a proxy
for the level of property rights protection. If property rights protection is
dened as above, then there is a direct link between the protection and
risk.
Dierent variables reecting regional-government initiatives in the elds
of privatization, price liberalization, and industry subsidization were em-
ployed. The idea is that the major source of dierences in economic per-
formance of Russian regions might be considerable dierence of economic
policies of regional governments, which have had substantial discretion over
the implementation of reforms on the regional level. Berkowitz and DeJong
(1999) found that regional-government privatization initiatives have had a
signicant positive impact on establishment of new legal enterprises, and
thus promoted growth. In my empirical exercise (see results and discussion
below) I found no clear evidence in support of this view.
Since, as it is stated in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) \public rent-
seeking is likely to hurt innovative activities more than everyday produc-
tion', it was a priori plausible to focus on regional private investment
and consider it as a dependent variable. The theoretical model predicts
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that improper protection of property rights has a negative impact on in-
vestment. However, it was found that the entire set of our explanatory
variables have a very limited explanatory power for our investment vari-
able (using the average annual rate of change of investment in Russian
regions in 1996{1997).
It is necessary to control for the inuence of other possible determinants
of growth of regions. The list of explanatory variables include those re-
ecting industrial structure (e.g., the share of exportables or value-added
of tradable-goods sectors in world prices at some base year), share of the
military sector, and initial conditions (e.g., living costs in 1994). The rst
group accounts for regional economic dierences resulting from the ad-
justment of dierent sectors to a partial opening of the Russian economy
started in 1994. For military sector, we use the employment in the defense
industry. This measure may also serve as a proxy for overall quality of
labor force as employees of military sector are usually considered as more
skilled than those employed in other sectors. Although the Russian gov-
ernment demand for military hardware declined sharply, it is showed in
Gaddy (1996) that employment in the defense sector remained relatively
stable during the transition.
The baseline models and estimation results are as follows. In both cases,
I used similar specications and report OLS results. Both pairs of regres-
sion were checked for potential simultaneity between Growth and NewEnt
and Growth and Risk, respectively: the rst estimations were 2SLS, the
tted values substituted into Growth regressions, and then the Hausman
specication test (Green, 1997) was used to test the equivalence. The test
statistics showed that there is no evidence of simultaneity between Growth
and NewEnt and Growth and Risk. This equivalence allowed to consider
the OLS results only.
In doing this, data on 47 Russian regions in which the capital city comprises
at least thirty percent of the total population (including Moscow and St.
Petersburg) are employed. This restriction is due to two reasons: rst,
some data which are important for our investigation were collected at the
capital-city level; second, anecdotal evidence suggests that such regions
demonstrate tighter interconnection between policies and their outcomes.
The control variables Defense, Moscow, Control, and North (i) are weakly
correlated amongst themselves; (ii) have higher degree of correlation with
NewEnt and Risk, than with Growth, and thus were used in the NewEnt
and Risk regressions.
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3.2.1. Data. The variables are dened as follows:
Growth Average annual growth rate of real per capita income, 1994-1997
NewEnt Number of legally registered small privately owned enterprises,
1996
Privat Index measuring the speed of regionally initiated small-scale
privatization, 1996
Share Share of privatized small-scale enterprises, 1994
Control Index of regional-government control of its capital, 1995
Price Index measuring the extent of price liberalization, 1995
Govern Share of regional government's expenditures on governance,
1994
Subsidy Share of direct subsidies to enterprises in region's expenditures,
1995
Inequality Ratio of 5-th and 1-th quantiles, 1994
Initial Ratio of per capita money income to the cost of 19-bundle, 1993
IO Value-added of tradable-goods sector in 1985 per employed
worker
Defense Number of workers employed in the military sector per thousand
of employed workers, 1985
Municipal The share of privatization initiated by the local government,
1994{1995
Resources An index of resource potential
Moscow Dummy for Moscow city
North Dummy for Northern territories (and territories with equal
status)
PolitInst Index of political stability compiled by MFK Renaissance,
1995{1996
Risk Risk rating compiled by the Bank of Austria, 1995{1996
Sources: Goskomstat-RSY (1994{1998): Growth, NewEnt, Inequality, De-
fense, Municipal, Share, Govern, Subsidy; TACIS (1995): Privat, Price,
Control, Resources; Berkowitz and DeJong (1999): IO, Initial; MFK Re-
naissance: PolitInst; Bank of Austria: Risk.
3.2.2. Growth Regressions. The Growth regression is as follows:
Growth= 
0
+ 
1
Level-of-Protection+
2
IO+
3
Resources+
4
PolitInst+u:
22 INEQUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
There are two dierent proxies for the level of public protection: NewEnt
and Risk. Correlation between the these two proxies is 0; 82%. Below the
results of two OLS growth regressions are reported and briey discussed.
Sensitivity Analysis for the whole exercise is provided below.
Dependent variable: Growth
R
2
= 0:439156; F (4; 42) = 8:2218[0:0001]
Variable Coecient Std.Error
t-value
t-prob
Constant 3.1777 4.4982 0.706 0.484
IO 0.1332 0.0458 2.906 0.006
PolitInst  0.1730 0.0616  2.811 0.008
Resources  17.838 37.180  0.480 0.634
NewEnt 1.4356 0.2796 5.136 0.000
Dependent variable: Growth
R
2
= 0:556725; F (4; 42) = 13:187[0:0000]
Variable Coecient Std.Error
t-value
t-prob
Constant 26.9220 5.8023 4.812 0.000
IO 0.0817 0.0406 2.013 0.050
PolitInst  0.1881 0.0545  3.452 0.001
Resources  30.499 33.270  0.917 0.3645
Risk  3.6359 0.5449  6.672 0.000
The estimation results reported above are quite encouraging. Both the
NewEnt and Risk variables (proxies for the level of public protection of
property rights) is very (see Sensitivity Analysis below) signicant (at 1
percent level) and has the predicted sign: the higher is the level of property
rights protection by the state (lower the risk), the higher is the growth
rate of real income per capita. The IO variable reecting pre-transition
industrial structure (higher IO means higher value-added of tradable-goods
sector) and the index PolitInst for political instability (compiled by MFK
Renaissance using 1995{1996 data) are also signicant at 1 percent level
and have the expected signs. Political instability is bad for growth, while
good initial position in terms of productive capacities leads to a higher
growth rate (in the model the growth rate increases with A).
3.2.3. NewEnt and Risk Regressions. To test the model's predic-
tions on impact of inequality and rent-seeking on the level of public protec-
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tion of property rights, I estimated both proxies for the level of protection
using variables for inequality (Inequality, ratio of 5-th and 1-th quantiles,
1994) and extent of rent-seeking (Govern).
NewEnt = 
0
+ 
1
Defense + 
2
Moscow + 
3
Control +
+ 
4
North + 
5
Govern + 
6
Inequality +w;
Risk = 
0
+ 
1
Defense + 
2
Moscow + 
3
Control +
+ 
4
North + 
5
Govern + 
6
Inequality +w:
Dependent variable: NewEnt
R
2
= 0:681342; F (6; 40) = 14:254[0:0000]
Variable Coecient Std.Error
t-value
t-prob
Constant 0.7593 0.9199 0.825 0.414
Defense 3.4782 2.0213 1.721 0.093
Moscow 11.527 1.6800 6.861 0.000
Control 2.6300 1.2175 2.160 0.036
Inequality 0.1067 0.0293 3.636 0.000
North 1.9308 0.6223 3.103 0.003
Govern  0.7702 0.2616  2.944 0.005
Dependent variable: Risk
R
2
= 0:499679, F (6; 40) = 6:6581[0:0001]
Variable Coecient Std.Error
t-value
t-prob
Constant 5.4490 0.5280 10.320 0.000
Defense  2.0778 1.1602  1.791 0.080
Moscow  4.3077 0.96431  4.467 0.000
Control 0.3075 0.6988 0.440 0.662
Inequality  0.0420 0.15019  2.499 0.016
North  0.6341 0.357  1.775 0.083
Govern 0.3663 0.1501 2.440 0.019
The results are again supportive for the theory. All the variables are
signicant at 10 percent level and have the expected signs. (Note that Risk
and NewEnt have \dierent signs": higher level of protection provided
by the state is reected by higher NewEnt and lower Risk. Thus, the
coecients in the two equations should have opposite signs.) Inequality
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is signicant at 5 percent level in the NewEnt regression and at 1 percent
level in the Risk regression. The coecients show that an increase in the
ratio of 5-th and 1-th quantiles improves public protection of property
rights as it was predicted by the theory. One might infer that this nding
provide some support for the assumption that the policy in Russian regions
is determined by a relatively small group of rich agents ( is large). The
rent-seeking proxy, Govern, is signicant at 5 percent level in the NewEnt
regression and at 1 percent level in the Risk regression. This also strongly
supports the model's implications. The Moscow dummy is signicant at
1 percent level in both regressions. However, it is more important that
the inclusion of a dummy for Moscow have not altered the qualitative
results. The Control variable is signicant at 5 percent level in the NewEnt
regression and is insignicant in the Risk regression (and has the wrong
sign). The variable reecting initial position in terms of human capital
(Defense) has the predicted sign and is signicant at 10 percent level in
both regressions.
3.2.4. Why There Were No Policy Variables? The list of variables
above includes some variables reecting dierences in reform policies im-
plemented at the regional level: privatization (Privat, Share, Municipal),
price liberalization (Price), and subsidies for enterprises (subsidy). How-
ever, I found no possibility to obtain signicant impact of any of these
variables either on growth in 1994{1997 or on level of property rights
protection (basically, in specications described above). One possible ex-
planation is that these policy variables are endogenous to initial conditions
(including inequality). It should be emphasized that Berkowitz and De-
Jong (1999) found a signicant impact of reforms on growth of Russian
regions. (The model specication was dierent.) For transition economies,
there is a vast literature in support of the view that privatization and lib-
eralization policies have very little eect on growth, while initial conditions
and eciency of institutions matter (see, e.g., Popov, 1998).
3.2.5. Sensitivity Analysis. To take into account possible inuence of
geographical positions, dummies for geographic territories, and a dummy
for the regions taking control of more than 1 (5, alternatively) percent of
known Russia's natural resources were employed. None of these dummies
(with exception for the Moscow dummy and the dummy for Northern
territories) were signicant in either of regressions, and their use did not
alter the qualitative results of estimation.
The statistical results obtained are robust with respect to modications
of the measures of growth and new enterprise formation. Specically, the
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growth in per capita food purchasing power of money income (1993{1996)
as an alternative measure of regions's growth (data on both measures were
reported by Goskomstat) was used. For the development of new enterprises
the total number of registered enterprises per thousand inhabitants were
employed. These new regressions lead to results similar to those reported
above; in particular, coecients for NewEnt, IO, PolitInst in the growth
regression and Inequality and Govern remained signicant and having the
expected sign. Also, we studied robustness excluding the insignicant
variables from the analysis. The only change is that Defense becomes
insignicant at 10% level.
To determine the validity of exclusion of Defense, Moscow, Control,
Inequality, North, and Govern from the growth regression, I regressed
Growth on the entire set of explanatory variables (separately for Risk and
NewEnt) and then estimated the restricted equation by OLS. I obtained
F statistic of 0:66 with P -value of 0:19. Then I conducted a usual exclu-
sion-restriction test (see Greene, 1997) for each explanatory variable that
does not enter the baseline growth regression. The smallest P -value ob-
tained is 0:23. Also, there was found no evidence against exclusion of
Growth from the NewEnt and Risk equations.
3.3. Other Evidence
The implications of the theoretical model are quite general and may be ap-
plied not only to economies in transition, but to development of poor coun-
tries and historical examples as well. For economies in transition, some
recent papers provide support to the main general messages of the model:
rst, institutional environment is a key ingredient of economic recovery;
second, political economy is very important. References include Johnson,
Kaufman, and Shleifer (1998), Leitzel (1997), Popov (1998); Berglof and
van Thadden (1999), and many others. Below two papers which directly
study Russian institutional environment are briey discussed.
Recently, Frye and Shleifer (1997) conducted a survey of 105 small shops
in Moscow (55) and Warsaw (50) to compare the eectiveness of the Rus-
sian and Polish legal systems in dispute resolution and the role of possible
protection providers. Their study showed that in Russia, private protec-
tion of property rights is wide-spread, there is much more need in public
protection, and also that enterprises have to operate in much more cor-
rupt environment. Also, Frye and Zhuravskaya (1998) conducted a survey
of shopkeepers in three cities in Russia and found that higher level of
municipal-level regulation and lower levels of public good provision are
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associated with higher probability of work under private protection. All
of these three cities (Moscow, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk) enter our data set
(Growth = 0:54; 0:04; 0:05, resp.) and are large cities located in the Eu-
ropean part of Russia. For illustrative purposes, the reader is provided
with some results of the survey (for the full detail, see Frye and Zhu-
ravskaya, 1998):
Index Moscow Smolensk Ulyanovsk
Number of permits required to open 6.23 5.29 8.77
Number of inspections [regulation] 16.34 16.22 21.96
Contact with racket ever, % 86.0 51.9 56.7
Rate you biggest problems, 1{10
Taxes 8.517 8.00 8.38
Capital Shortage 6.57 6.67 6.97
Rental rates 7.88 5.58 6.02
Corruption 4.83 5.42 6.25
The results of this \case study" are consistent with main messages of the
empirical results of this paper: deregulation and proper public protection
of property rights have positive impact on economic performance of a re-
gion. One surprising fact is that the survey shows that taxes are considered
as the main problem by a great majority of shopkeepers. Berkowitz and
DeJong (1999), while explaining the insignicance of the tax variable in
their growth regression, suggest that \much of the burden is in the form
of unreported payments demanded by cash strapped or corrupt ocials".
However, it seems that the survey of Frye and Zhuravskaya (1998) have
made an explicit distinction between the tax payments and the unreported
payments for the respondents. So, it remains a puzzle.
4. CONCLUSION
Currently, the problem of eective enforcement and regulation of property
rights is of crucial importance for Russia and other economies in tran-
sition. The results of the theoretical analysis and the existing empirical
evidence clarify the mechanism underlying the negative inuence of poor
protection of property rights and the reverse eect of inequality on the
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economic performance of Russian regions. Agents with no political power
to appropriate privately the fruits of their eorts must devote substantial
resources to the protection of their productive capital, and this reduces the
attractiveness of production. In other words, the contestability of prop-
erty rights diminishes incentives to invest and accumulate capital. Income
inequality, which have substantially increased during transition, has a sig-
nicant and positive impact on the level of property rights protection. This
suggests that the level of property rights protection is determined (in the
framework of the analysis) by a narrow group of agents. In theory, it can
be easily seen that improvements in the eld of property rights protection
(both in the level and the eectiveness), and a reduction in the level of
rent-seeking activity, which in turn should reduce inequality, are unavoid-
able preconditions for economic growth. Such improvements may occur
only if they are in the self-interest of the majority of population or at least
of the majority of those who determine the policy. In this respect, further
democratization should lead to more public protection of property rights,
and thus increase growth.
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